Mostrando postagens com marcador The Economist. Mostrar todas as postagens
Mostrando postagens com marcador The Economist. Mostrar todas as postagens

quinta-feira, 26 de fevereiro de 2015

The Economist > "O Brasil está em atoleiro..."


26/02/2015 13h29 - ATUALIZADA EM: 26/02/2015 15h03 - POR ÉPOCA NEGÓCIOS ONLINE

BRASIL ESTÁ EM ATOLEIRO, DIZ ECONOMIST EM MANCHETE DE CAPA

PARA A REVISTA, "A ECONOMIA DO BRASIL ESTÁ EM UMA BAGUNÇA, COM PROBLEMAS MUITO MAIORES DO QUE O GOVERNO ADMITE OU INVESTIDORES PARECEM PERCEBER"

Nova edição da Economist destaca o Brasil na capa (Foto: Reprodução/Facebook)
A revista The Economist traz novamente esta semana uma capa sobre o Brasil. Na edição latino-americana que chega às bancas, uma passista de escola de samba está em um pântano coberta de gosma verde com o título "O atoleiro do Brasil". Em editorial, a revista diz que a primeira estrela da América Latina "está na maior bagunça desde o começo dos anos 1990".
O país já tinha sido capa da revista em 2009, com a imagem do Cristo Redentor decolando. Quatro anos depois, o mesmo Cristo aparecia em queda livre. No ano passado, a Economist defendeu a eleição de Aécio Neves
A capa da edição da Economist para o restante do mundo não tem o país como tema principal e dá destaque a outro assunto: o avanço dos telefones celulares.
A Economist diz em editorial que, durante a campanha à reeleição, Dilma Rousseff descreveu a situação do país como positiva, afirmando que o pleno emprego, o aumento dos salários e benefícios sociais estavam ameaçados apenas pelos planos neoliberais de seus opositores. "Após dois meses no cargo, os brasileiros estão percebendo que o que lhes foi vendido era um falso prospecto", diz a revista.
O texto diz que "a economia do Brasil está numa bagunça, com problemas bem maiores do que o governo admite ou que os investidores parecem perceber". Entre os problemas estão a economia estagnada, a inflação, a diminuição dos investimentos, o escândalo de corrupção da Petrobras que teve como efeito colateral a paralisação de empreiteiras, e a desvalorização do real. A revista também cita a queda de popularidade da presidente.
"Escapar desse atoleiro seria difícil mesmo para uma grande liderança política. Dilma, no entanto, é fraca. Ela ganhou a eleição por pequena margem e sua base política está se desintegrando", diz a revista.
A Economist afirma que boa parte dos problemas brasileiros foram gerados pelo próprio governo que adotou uma estratégia de "capitalismo de Estado" no primeiro mandato. Isso gerou fracos resultados nas contas públicas e minou a política industrial e a competitividade, diz o editorial.
Por outro lado, a publicação parece ter gostado da nomeação de Levy para a Fazenda. "Para dar o devido crédito, a sra. Rousseff pelo menos reconheceu que o Brasil precisa de políticas mais favoráveis aos negócios se quiser manter seu grau de investimento e voltar a crescer. Esse entendimento é personificado pelo novo ministro da Fazenda,Joaquim Levy, um economista de Chicago e banqueiro e um um dos poucos economistas liberais do país".
As reformas anunciadas por Levy, porém, enfrentam o risco de serem anuladas por uma recessão ou menor arrecadação. É o maior teste que o país enfrentam desde os anos 1990, afirma a Economist. "Se o Brasil tiver uma repetição dos protestos de 2013 contra a corrupção e serviços precários, a sra. Rousseff pode estar fadada ao fracasso".
Entre as medidas para que o Brasil retome o caminho do crescimento sustentado, a revista diz que "pode ser muito esperar uma reforma das arcaicas leis trabalhistas". "Mas ela deve pelo menos tentar simplificar os impostos e reduzir a burocracia sem sentido", diz o texto, ao citar que há sinais de que o Brasil pode se abrir mais ao comércio exterior.
O texto termina com a lembrança de que o Brasil não é o único dos BRICS que enfrenta problemas. "Mesmo com todos os seus problemas, o Brasil não está em uma confusão tão grande como a Rússia. O Brasil tem um grande e diversificado setor privado e instituições democráticas robustas. Mas seus problemas podem ir mais fundo do que muitos imaginam. O tempo para reagir é agora".

sexta-feira, 31 de outubro de 2014

Ações da política financeira de Dilma se tornam bumerangue para si mesma... // The Economist


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Economist: "Herança de Dilma para si mesma é problemática"

Em nova reportagem sobre as eleições no Brasil, a revista britânica diz que presidente reeleita tem de nomear ministro da Fazenda competente e deixá-lo trabalhar sem inferferências


JOSÉ FUCS
31/10/2014 15h25 - Atualizado em 31/10/2014 15h37

Depois de declarar seu apoio a Aécio Neves numa reportagem de capa sobre as eleições no Brasil, a britânica The Economist, a bíblia dos investidores globais, publicou na edição desta semana, que chegou nesta quinta-feira às bancas, uma reportagem sobre a vitória da presidente Dilma Rousseff. Com o título Duro de Matar Dilma (Diehard Dilma), o artigo aborda as limitações e os desafios que ela terá pela frente para tirar o Brasil do limbo no segundo mandato.
“Seu desempenho no primeiro mandato não justificou sua vitória. A herança que ela deixou para si mesma é problemática”, afirma a reportagem. “Ela inclui recessão, inflação acima da meta do Banco Central, contas públicas opacas, dívida pública crescente e uma eminente redução na classificação de risco do Brasil, assim como um déficit em conta corrente de 3,7% do PIB (Produto Interno Bruto), que é o maior desde 2002 e é financiado parcialmente pelo ‘hot money’ (cujo ardor provavelmente vai diminuir com a sua vitória).”
Segundo a revista,  Dilma tem de nomear um ministro da Fazenda competente,  com poder para fazer o seu trabalho sem interferências do Palácio do Planalto, para reforçar seus tímidos esforços para atrair investimentos privados na área de infraestrutura, e promover uma reforma tributária.  O risco, de acordo com a Economist, é Dilma trilhar um caminho mais tortuoso e o Brasil se tornar uma sociedade em que o Estado ofereça benesses para seus aliados, como a Venezuela. “Uma olhada na Venezuela deve dissuadir a senora Rousseff de perseguir essa trilha”, diz a Economist.
A revista destaca, ainda, a proposta de diálogo feita por Dilma, mas afirma que 16 anos de poder para um único partido é ruim para qualquer democracia. “Largamente conhecida como obstinada, a senhora Rousseff insiste que aprendeu a ouvir e a mudar. Esperamos que ele esteja falando sério.”
Siga o blog pelo Twitter em @josefucs
Leia outros posts do blog em http://epoca.globo.com/colunas-e-blogs/blog-do-fucs/

sexta-feira, 29 de agosto de 2014

Agouros de Agosto...

http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21614151-utterly-shockingand-distinctively-britishchild-sex-abuse-scandal-see-no-evil-hear-no-evil?fsrc=nlw|hig|28-08-2014|538fcc439dbcd45f5f0003ee|LA

quarta-feira, 25 de junho de 2014

Dilema de jogadores islamitas que jogam a Copa do Mundo

http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/06/economist-explains-11?fsrc=nlw|newe|24-06-2014|5356ca47899249e1ccc222fe|LA


The Economist explains

How professional sportsmen cope with Ramadan



THIS year Ramadan begins on June 28th, just as the knockout stage of matches gets under way at the World Cup. It is the first time since 1986 that the tournament has coincided with Islam’s holy month. This will cause a dilemma for some Muslim footballers. During Ramadan observant Muslims are expected to refrain from eating, drinking and sex, from dawn until sunset. Contrary to their licentious reputation, most players can cope with the latter. Nutrition, though, is considered critical to a sportsman's preparation—particularly in Brazil, where the climate can be punishing for even the best-prepared athletes. In Fortaleza, which is hosting several big games, daylight lasts around 12 hours, with the sun rising and setting at around 5.30am and 5.30pm. The average maximum temperature in July is 30ºC (86ºF); humidity reaches an average of 92%. How do footballers who observe Ramadan cope?
Many teams in this World Cup have a large Muslim presence—and not only those representing predominantly Islamic countries such as Bosnia & Herzegovina, Algeria and Iran. Star players from France (Karim Benzema), Germany (Mesut Özil), Switzerland (Philippe Senderos), Belgium (Marouane Fellaini) and Ivory Coast (Yaya Touré), among numerous others, will have to decide how to deal with Ramadan, should their teams make it that far in the competition.
Players are advised to eat plenty of slow-release carbohydrates, like sweet potato and corn, outside of fasting hours, according to Zaf Iqbal, Liverpool FC’s club doctor. They should also avoid anything with too much sugar, which is a quick-release carbohydrate. However, sports nutritionists suggest that the lack of fluid has a bigger impact than the lack of food. Dehydration can affect cognitive functions. Muslim athletes often report feeling fatigued and can suffer from mood swings during Ramadan, according to a 2009 paper in the International Journal of Sports Physiology and Performance. It can also increase the risk of injury. Muslim footballers are told to drink plenty of liquid before dawn, and to make sure they do not train during the hottest parts of the day. Indeed, as fasting can also affect sleep patterns, some team doctors advise players to take a siesta instead. Where such steps are taken, most studies suggest that athletes’ training performance is not adversely affected.
But dehydration during matches could be a problem. Unlike training sessions, match times cannot be tailored to a sportsman's needs. So many Muslim athletes take a pragmatic approach. While some, such as Kolo Touré (pictured), an Ivory Coast defender, are strict observers, others, like Marouane Chamakh, a forward for Morocco (which did not qualify), fast on most days but not on the eve of a game or on matchday itself. (Mr Chamakh says he makes up the lost days later in the year.) Others postpone fasting altogether during important events. During the London Olympics in 2012, which also coincided with Ramadan, Abdul Buhari, a British shot-putter, told the Guardian he believed it was impossible to stay in peak condition while fasting, so he came to another arrangement: “I believe God is forgiving, and I'll make up for every single day I've missed.”
- See more at: http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/06/economist-explains-11?fsrc=nlw|newe|24-06-2014|5356ca47899249e1ccc222fe|LA#sthash.VMan2nkX.dpuf

quarta-feira, 4 de junho de 2014

O Brasil está na moda... Os protestos são os combustíveis para divulgação... The Economist


Protest in Brazil

Cheering for Argentina

The protest movement that shook Brazil last year has not died. But it is unlikely to disrupt the World Cup







WITH a university degree and a flat in a smart neighbourhood of São Paulo, Ernesto Filho, a 33-year-old choreographer and dancer, is not your average Brazilian. He is, however, typical of the 1m people who took to the streets 12 months ago, in the greatest social unrest Brazil has seen in two decades.

The protests began on June 6th last year, with a small rally against a rise in São Paulo bus fares of 20 centavos (at the time, nine American cents). Over two weeks they morphed into a nationwide outpouring of dismay at shoddy public services, corruption, the cost of living, ineffectual government and much else. Since then politicians and pundits have been analysing the events, which unfolded as Brazil hosted the Confederations Cup, a warm-up tournament for the football World Cup that begins on June 12th—and trying to work out whether they should brace for a replay.
In this section
Cheering for Argentina
Uribe’s wrath
No place like home
The reform that got away
Reprints
Related topics
Civil unrest
War and conflict
Sao Paulo
Latin American politics
Brazilian politics

For now the betting is against another round of mass demonstrations. Among paulistanos support for them has dropped from 89% at the end of June 2013 to just 52% now, according to Datafolha, a pollster. That shift reflects the changing profile of the protesters, says Christopher Garman of Eurasia Group, a risk-analysis firm.

Research has found that an overwhelming majority of those who took part in the first big protests were, like Mr Filho, under 35, university-educated or students, and protest novices rather than hardened activists. Most had little sympathy for established political parties. They were also better off than average. Normally a quiet bunch, this middle class rose up at first in response to brutal repression of the bus-fare crowd by ill-trained police. Images of journalists wounded by rubber bullets and innocent bystanders choked by tear gas prompted Brazil’s conservative press, which had called for a crackdown on public disorder, to perform an about-turn.

The authorities’ reaction, Mr Garman explains, inadvertently helped to reshape the protests. Policemen were told to restrain themselves; seeing their popularity plummet, mayors around the country rushed to reverse bus-fare rises. This galvanised organised social movements with traditional agendas and, often, links to political parties, to occupy the space left open by the retreating riot police. Violent elements such as “Black Blocs”, an anarchist group, moved in as well.

The fire last time

In the year since, the protests have become more overtly political, and more extreme—putting off moderates such as Mr Filho who had at first bulked them out. Again, the authorities have been partly responsible. After the initial panic, little changed. Talk of a constituent assembly, for example—an idea floated by President Dilma Rousseff in response to calls for political reform—came to nothing.

That convinced Black Blocs of the futility of peaceful protest, says Esther Solano of the Federal University of São Paulo. In February a cameraman covering a protest in Rio de Janeiro died after being struck by a firework set off by two of the group’s members. Violence and the presence of 100,000 policemen and 57,000 soldiers enlisted to keep the peace during the football championship are likely to deter many middle-class protesters.

None of which means the tournament will be entirely protest-free. On May 27th 2,500 indigenous and other militants confronted the police in Brasília, the capital. A few days earlier, in São Paulo, at least 15,000 homeless people blocked one of the city’s main thoroughfares at rush hour, clogging already congested streets in the biggest single protest since last June. Guilherme Boulos, a leader of the protesters, says he was encouraged by last year’s bus-fare reversals; his main demand now is for City Hall formally to hand over property that the protesters are occupying illegally. A huge rally to commemorate the bus-fare triumph is planned for June 19th, this time to agitate for a bigger prize: universal free public transport.

These demands are either too narrow or too radical to impress most Brazilians, who are consequently less willing to tolerate the considerable inconvenience caused by those who make them. At the same time, politicians are less likely to bow to activists’ whims if these are not backed by an outraged citizenry.

Bruno Torturra of Mídia Ninja, an activist news outlet, thinks the scale of World Cup protests will depend on how well the event is run, as well as on the performance of Brazil’s team on the pitch. Support for the tournament has already plummeted from 79% in 2007 to 48%. Should the national team be eliminated early, Mr Torturra reckons, more Brazilians are bound to question the extravagant expense, which the government puts at 25.8 billion reais ($11.5 billion), spending that has not yielded the promised public infrastructure. “Social movements are quietly cheering for Brazil to lose,” remarks one activist, “even to arch-rival Argentina.”

But, given both skill and home advantage, the odds are that the Brazilian team will do well. And there are other reasons why unrest is unlikely to spiral. Last year’s protests took everyone by surprise. That is no longer true. Security forces will be careful not to repeat the excesses of last June; 13,000 police officers have received special training in facing down troublemakers without undue violence. The social movements, for their part, will also tread carefully. Many have a bone to pick with Ms Rousseff’s Workers’ Party. But they are far less keen on her centre-right rivals in the presidential poll this October, who would use any upheaval to score electoral points.

Last June was a dress rehearsal for the World Cup and, for the politicians, a warm-up for arguments at the presidential election. This year there is more at stake, both for them and for Brazil’s reputation. Not wanting to be tainted by association with the radicals, and fearful for their own safety, Mr Filho and many like him plan to play safe, and stay at home.

domingo, 2 de março de 2014

O que é que deu errado com a democracia ??

http://www.economist.com/news/essays/21596796-democracy-was-most-successful-political-idea-20th-century-why-has-it-run-trouble-and-what-can-be-do

Protestors in Kiev, February 2014
Democracy was the most successful political idea of the 20th century. Why has it run into trouble, and what can be done to revive it?
Leia pelo link lá de cima

domingo, 9 de fevereiro de 2014

Sochi é o local ideal para os Jogos de Inverno da Rússia...!!! / The Economist

http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/02/economist-explains-2

The Economist explains

Why Sochi is, ironically, the perfect place for the winter Olympics

  SOCHI, a subtropical resort on the  Black Sea coast, seems an odd place to stage the winter Olympics. It is the warmest place in Russia, where people go to escape winter. The weather forecast for the coast where the opening ceremony will be held on February 7th is 10-12°C (50-54°F). The competitions which require snow will be held in the mountains above Sochi, where the day temperature is just above freezing. Fearing a lack of snow, Russia stored last year's (though recent snowfalls made this insurance measure superfluous). Sochi is also on the edge of a war zone in the North Caucasus. Counter-terrorist operations are being carried out less than 200 miles away. Why did the Russians make such a curious choice?
Russian officials point out that Sochi is not the first subtropical location for the winter Olympics. Nagano in Japan, which also has a subtropical climate, hosted the games in 1998. And as for the threat of a terrorist attack, nowhere is safe these days: security measures for the London Olympics were just as stringent. That is all true. Sochi was chosen mainly because it is a favourite playground of Vladimir Putin, Russia's president. He spends much time at his Sochi residence and intends the games to be seen as proof of his mastery over nature and a symbol of his international legitimacy. Yet the choice is, ironically, entirely apt in one respect. Since Soviet times Sochi has had a reputation as a brash and seedy resort, a hotspot for holiday sex and a place where black-marketers and underground entrepreneurs from across the Soviet Union spent their not-always-honestly-earned roubles. "If I knew a card trick, I'd live in Sochi," runs an old saying. This makes it arguably the perfect place to hold the Olympics, which have become a model of Russia's crony capitalism and a world championship of corruption. Those who won the construction contracts certainly know a trick or two.
Sochi has already set the record for the most expensive games in history. At an estimated cost of $51 billion it is five times as expensive as the winter Olympics in Nagano, the preparation for which involved the construction of arenas, roads and a bullet-train line from Tokyo. The main reason for such astronomical cost is graft. That, at least, is what nearly 50% of Russians believe, according to opinion polls. Only 15% buy the arguments made by officials that it was the complexity of the project that increased the cost. Corruption comes in different forms: overstating costs, giving contracts to friends and relatives (some of whom have no qualifications) and reworking the same construction site several times over to justify charging more. Most of the money came directly from the state or via state banks. Alexei Navalny, an anti-corruption blogger and opposition politician, says the cost over-run is 150-250%. He has published lists of the main winners of the Olympic projects. The fact that some of the hotels still have not been finished makes the level of spending all the more extraordinary.
As for the rest of the Russian population, it is less than enthused about the Sochi games, which they see as Soviet-style showing-off and a waste of money that would have been better spent on crumbling hospitals, roads and schools. A recent opinion poll by the Levada Centre shows that 38% of Russians feel that the main reason for holding the Sochi games is to divvy up state money. Less than a quarter of Russia's population see any benefits for the country's prestige. Sochi, you might say, has left them cold.

segunda-feira, 2 de dezembro de 2013

Oportunidades de negócios em Portugal em 2014 ! The Lisbon Summit / Fevereiro

http://cemea.economistconferences.com/event/lisbon-summit?utm_source=Economist&utm_medium=Banner&utm_campaign=ECBAN_EM1290#.Up0V_IFTsf4
The Lisbon Summit


Join us for the most 

important business event 

for Portugal in 2014!
The Economist Event’s The Lisbon Summit will bring policymakers together with business leaders and investors for a day of debate and dialogue around the tough choices facing the country, addressing the questions at the heart of Portugal's dilemma.
Three years into recession, Portugal has recently unveiled an ambitious stimulus programme to revive its economy. The government wants to reduce corporation tax, produce incentives to attract more overseas companies, cut down on bureaucracy and provide cheap financing for smaller firms.
While the budget deficit has shrunk from 12.6% of GDP in 2008 to 1.5% in 2012, the country is still undergoing a severe economic adjustment. GDP is shrinking, unemployment is growing and the country's EU/IMF adjustment programme imposes tough fiscal measures and structural reforms. 
CONFIRMED: Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho will join us to discuss the government's reform agenda and Portugal's economic, political and social outlook.
Topics to be discussed at The Lisbon Summit include:
  • How to reform the state and achieve sustainable public finances? 
  • How to rebalance Portugal's economy to position it for growth?
  • How can technological innovation fundamentally change businesses and create exciting new opportunities for Portuguese firms?
  • How can Portugal benefit from opportunities in high-growth markets?

quarta-feira, 9 de outubro de 2013

The Economist continua assustado com os rumos do Brasil /

Brazil’s future

Has Brazil blown it?

A stagnant economy, a bloated state and mass protests mean Dilma Rousseff must change course

                                                     


 FOUR years ago this newspaper put on its cover a picture of the statue of Christ the Redeemer ascending like a rocket from Rio de Janeiro’s Corcovado mountain, under the rubric “Brazil takes off”. The economy, having stabilised under Fernando Henrique Cardoso in the mid-1990s, accelerated under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the early 2000s. It barely stumbled after the Lehman collapse in 2008 and in 2010 grew by 7.5%, its strongest performance in a quarter-century. To add to the magic, Brazil was awarded both next year’s football World Cup and the summer 2016 Olympics. On the strength of all that, Lula persuaded voters in the same year to choose as president his technocratic protégée, Dilma Rousseff.
Since then the country has come back down to earth with a bump. In 2012 the economy grew by 0.9%. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets in June in the biggest protests for a generation, complaining of high living costs, poor public services and the greed and corruption of politicians. Many have now lost faith in the idea that their country was headed for orbit and diagnosed just another voo de galinha (chicken flight), as they dubbed previous short-lived economic spurts.
There are excuses for the deceleration. All emerging economies have slowed. Some of the impulses behind Brazil’s previous boom—the pay-off from ending runaway inflation and opening up to trade, commodity price rises, big increases in credit and consumption—have played themselves out. And many of Lula’s policies, notably the Bolsa Família that helped lift 25m people out of poverty, were admirable.
The world’s most burdensome tax code
But Brazil has done far too little to reform its government in the boom years. It is not alone in this: India had a similar chance, and missed it. But Brazil’s public sector imposes a particularly heavy burden on its private sector, as our special report explains. Companies face the world’s most burdensome tax code, payroll taxes add 58% to salaries and the government has got its spending priorities upside down.
Compare pensions and infrastructure. The former are absurdly generous. The average Brazilian can look forward to a pension of 70% of final pay at 54. Despite being a young country, Brazil spends as big a share of national income on pensions as southern Europe, where the proportion of old people is three times as big. By contrast, despite the country’s continental dimensions and lousy transport links, its spending on infrastructure is as skimpy as a string bikini. It spends just 1.5% of GDP on infrastructure, compared with a global average of 3.8%, even though its stock of infrastructure is valued at just 16% of GDP, compared with 71% in other big economies. Rotten infrastructure loads unnecessary costs on businesses. In Mato Grosso a soyabean farmer spends 25% of the value of his product getting it to a port; the proportion in Iowa is 9%.
These problems have accumulated over generations. But Ms Rousseff has been unwilling or unable to tackle them, and has created new problems by interfering far more than the pragmatic Lula. She has scared investors away from infrastructure projects and undermined Brazil’s hard-won reputation for macroeconomic rectitude by publicly chivvying the Central Bank chief into slashing interest rates. As a result, rates are now having to rise more than they otherwise might to curb persistent inflation. Rather than admit to missing its fiscal targets, the government has resorted to creative accounting. Gross public debt has climbed to 60-70% of GDP, depending on the definition—and the markets do not trust Ms Rousseff.
Fortunately, Brazil has great strengths. Thanks to its efficient and entrepreneurial farmers, it is the world’s third-biggest food exporter. Even if the government has made the process slower and costlier than it needed to be, Brazil will be a big oil exporter by 2020. It has several manufacturing jewels, and is developing a world-class research base in biotechnology, genetic sciences and deep-sea oil and gas technology. The consumer brands that have grown along with the country’s expanding middle class are ready to go abroad. Despite the recent protests, it does not have the social or ethnic divisions that blight other emerging economies, such as India or Turkey.
An own goal for Dilma Fernández?
But if Brazil is to recover its vim, it needs to rediscover an appetite for reform. With taxes already taking 36% of GDP—the biggest proportion in the emerging world alongside Cristina Fernández’s chaotic Argentina—the government cannot look to taxpayers for the extra money it must spend on health care, schools and transport to satisfy the protesters. Instead, it needs to reshape public spending, especially pensions.
Second, it must make Brazilian business more competitive and encourage it to invest. The way to do that is not, as the government believes, to protect firms, but to expose them to more foreign competition while moving far more swiftly to eliminate the self-inflicted obstacles they face at home. Brazil’s import tariffs remain high and its customs procedures are a catalogue of bloody-minded obstructionism. More dynamic Latin American economies have forged networks of bilateral trade deals. Brazil has hidden behind Mercosur, a regional block that has dwindled into a leftist talking-shop, and the moribund Doha round of world-trade talks. It needs to open up.
Third, Brazil urgently needs political reform. The proliferation of parties, whose only interest is pork and patronage, builds in huge waste at every level of government. One result is a cabinet with 39 ministries. On paper, the solution is easy: a threshold for seats in Congress and other changes to make legislators more accountable to voters. But getting those who benefit from the current system to agree to change it requires more political skill than Ms Rousseff has shown.
In a year’s time Ms Rousseff faces an election in which she will seek a second four-year term. On her record so far, Brazil’s voters have little reason to give her one. But she has time to make a start on the reforms needed, by trimming red tape, merging ministries and curbing public spending. Brazil is not doomed to flop: if Ms Rousseff puts her hand on the throttle there is still a chance that it could take off again.